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The Enigma cipher machine was invented in the early 1920s to help
businesses protect commercial secrets, but the German military soon saw
its potential application to military communications. By the mid-1930s,
every branch of the German military was using Enigma for nearly all their
encrypted communications. The electromechanical cipher machine works
using a system of wires, rotors, a reflector and a plugboard to send an
electrical signal from the keyboard to the lampboard, encrypting each
message letter by letter. Enigma masterfully balances ease of use and
security, the opposing forces of any cryptosystem. The key space is ap-
proximately 15 million million million, and it could be compared to a
Vigenére cipher with a key length of 16900. Though it seemed infallible,
the infamous machine eventually failed. While the cryptosystem did have
inherent technical flaws, its defeat was mainly a result of errors in human
operation. British intelligence at Bletchley Park was able to find patterns
in German messages and used these patterns as cracks to break into the
entire system. Enigma represents a vital moment in the field of cryptogra-
phy. It initiated the transition from by-hand methods to automated and
mechanized methods and acted as a catalyst for the development of com-
puters. Additionally, Enigma’s ultimate failure illustrated the inadequacy
of security through obscurity and pointed the future of cryptography to-
wards more advanced methods.
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1 Historical Context
The Second World War provided a catalyst for technological and mathematical
progress. Out of the war effort was born innumerable improvements in various
fields, and cryptography was no exception. The field of cryptography is one that
stretches far back in human history, nearly to the beginning of language itself.
For as long as mankind has sought to communicate with one another, the com-
municators have sometimes attempted to do so in secret. The word cryptogra-
phy comes from the Greek words kryptos, meaning hidden, and graphia, meaning
writing. It is an ancient field with a long history of innovations, but the primitive
methods of pre-war cryptography were ill fitted to the fast pace of the Second
World War. During World War I, military communications were accomplished
primarily using codebooks and clunky, time-consuming, and confusing methods
of encrypting and decrypting messages by hand.[3] Consequently, out of neces-
sity arose the advent of machine ciphers. After their defeat in the Great War,
Germany realized that its intelligence operations were greatly lacking—a large
contributor to their failures—and recognized need for improved military com-
munications and intelligence.[3] German Marine Captain Heinz Bonatz stated,
“Neither the German High Seas Fleet nor the Naval War Staff hit upon the
idea that it was German naval radio traffic which supplied the British their
knowledge.”[3, p. 13] It was clear that the current methods would no longer be
adequate, especially since the German military forces needed rapid and frequent
communications to execute their new Blitzkrieg war tactics.[3] They needed a
way to encrypt and decrypt messages that was quick and easy to use, but also
secure and nearly impossible to break.
Hugo Alexander Koch, a Dutch inventor, designed and constructed the
Enigma machine just after World War I for protecting commercial secrets in
the business world. The patent was soon purchased by Arthur Scheribus, a
German manufacturer, who also marketed the machine to the business world.[3]
In 1926, the German Marines took up Enigma, and the army did so shortly
after. They made numerous modifications and improvements to increase secu-
rity, each military branch eventually ending up with a slightly different version
of the machine.[3] By the mid-1930s, all branches of the German military were
using Enigma for nearly all of their encrypted communications.[3]
Polish intelligence made great strides in cracking Enigma throughout the
latter half of the decade by rebuilding Enigma’s internal structure and analyzing
the signals they received, but as the German invasion of Poland loomed, the
Poles passed off their acquired intelligence to the British and French.[3] The
British then set up facilities at Bletchley Park, about fifty miles north of London,
and stationed men and women of the Government Code and Cypher School there
to devote undivided attention to German radio communications.[3]
Though it initially seemed unbreakable, the British and their allies took ad-
vantage of Germany’s human errors and found much success deciphering mes-
sages by looking for repeated or predictable segments and using these to uncover
the rest of the message.[3] The decrypted messages and intelligence gleaned from
them were given the code name “Ultra” and were used with much discretion.
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Ultra intelligence could only be acted on if there was a plausible cover story
regarding how the Allies got the information. Still, decrypted Enigma messages
made it possible for the Allied forces to “avoid waiting U-boats, anticipate sur-
prise attaches, and send their own troops to the German’s most vulnerable
points.”[3, pg. 4] However, the Germans were so sure of Enigma’s security
that they failed to question the Allies’ mounting intelligence, crediting Allied
power knowledge and success to other possible information leaks, exactly as
the British intended.[3] Even after war ceased, as Enigma rumors spread, Ger-
man military leaders obstinately asserted its infallibility. They reasoned that
the Allies would be publicly boasting of a broken Enigma had they succeeded
in decrypting German codes. After all, who could stand to keep such an ac-
complishment to themselves? The Germans also claimed they would have seen
evidence of Enigma-cracking in intercepted and decoded Allied communications.
Therefore, they presumed Enigma to be in tact and German cryptography to
be entirely secured. This insistence persisted even into the 1970s when the Al-
lies finally announced publicly that they had indeed cracked Enigma during the
war.[3]
So how did Enigma work exactly? Why were the Germans so sure of its
invulnerability? Why were they wrong? How did the analysts and mathemati-
cians at Bletchley Park manage to break the unbreakable code? This, and more,
we will explore, but before we can confront the infamous Enigma machine, we
must begin with some cryptography basics.
2 Cryptography Basics and Simple Substitution
Ciphers
One of the simplest examples of a cryptosystem is a simple substitution cipher,
of which there are many forms. The basic premise of a substitution cipher
is to encrypt each letter in the alphabet to a predetermined letter. No two
letters can be encrypted to the same letter. In other words, it must be an
injective function.[2] For this type of encryption to work, it is essential that
both parties, the sender and the receiver, know the substitution alphabet being
used. Otherwise, the receiver would be unable to decrypt the message. Consider
the following example.
Let Table 1 indicate the encryption alphabet. Assume that Alice would like
to send a message that says, “I LOVE CRYPTOGRAPHY,” to her friend Bob.
This original message in readable form is known as the plaintext.[2] Before she
sends the message, Alice must encrypt it, so she uses the encryption alphabet
to encrypt each letter in the plaintext message to its corresponding letter in the
second column of the table. Starting from the beginning, I is encrypted to X, L is
encrypted to P, O is encrypted to O, and so on. She continues this process until
she has encoded the entire message so it reads, “X POGJ HFMRDOYFSRAM.”
This is known as the ciphertext and is what is sent to Bob. Once Bob receives the
message, he does the same process in reverse to recover the plaintext, “I LOVE
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CRYPTOGRAPHY.” Bob can then send a response using the same method.
In this type of cipher, the encryption alphabet forms the key, the information
needed to transform plaintext into ciphertext and vice versa.[2] A large factor
in determining the security of a cryptosystem is its key-space, which is the
number of possible keys. How big is the key-space for a simple substitution
cipher using the English alphabet? The answer can be calculated using a simple
combination. First of all, the letter A can be encrypted to any one of the 26
letters in the alphabet. Next, B can be encrypted to any of the remaining letters
(25 possibilities). There are 24 choices for C, and we continue on until we get to
Z, at which point there is only one remaining letter that we can use. Therefore
the size of the key-space is 26! = 403, 291, 461, 126, 605, 635, 584, 000, 000. A
random guess of the encryption alphabet is pretty unlikely. Even a brute force
attack, systematically trying every possible key, is nearly impossible. If one could
use a computer to test 1 billion keys per second, it would still take 12,753,347,700
5
years to try each possible key.
2.1 Caesar Cipher
One well-known version of a simple substitution cipher is the Caesar Cipher, so
named because it was used by Julius Caesar in his military communications.[2]
In a Caesar cipher:
1. Alice and Bob agree on a key k, which is an integer between 0 and 25.
2. Alice writes the plaintext message and shifts each letter k places in the
alphabet to form cipher text.
3. She sends ciphertext to Bob, who decrypts by shifting each letter k places
backwards. [2]
Going back to our previous example, let’s use a key 5 to encrypt Alice’s
message, “I LOVE CRYPTOGRAPHY.” We can also represent this key in a
tabular form, which is shown in Table 2.
Following the same process as the previous example, the message is encoded
to “N QTAJ HWDUYTLWFPMD” and is sent to Bob, who decrypts by shifting
each letter 5 places backwards. Though this system is convenient for Alice and
Bob—each only has to know the English alphabet and remember an agreed upon
number—it is also very easily broken by anyone who intercepts the message and
understands the nature of the encryption. The small key-space of 26 means that
a single person could easily discover the key relatively quickly with nothing more
than a pen and paper.[2]
As it turns out, though, the Caesar cipher and every other simple substi-
tution cipher are relatively easily broken using a technique known as frequency
analysis. This method is based on the fact that certain letters, such as E and
T, are used more frequently in the English language than others, like Q and X.
Table 3 lists the relative frequency of letters in the English language.
The frequency analysis technique is relatively easy to execute. Assume Alice
sends an encrypted message to Bob, and it is intercepted by Eve. Looking at the
ciphertext, Eve can assume that the letters used most frequently correlate to
commonly used letters in the English Language. For example, if G is the most
common letter in the ciphertext, Eve could try assuming that E is encrypted
to G. Using the process in a trial and error manner, Eve will likely be able to
piece together Alice’s original message. As we can see, frequency analysis is a
straightforward way to decipher any simple substitution cipher. Therefore, it
becomes necessary to introduce a more complicated cryptosystem, which is not
susceptible to basic frequency analysis.
3 The Vigenére Cipher
One method to protect against frequency analysis, to add another layer of secu-
rity, is to establish a cryptosystem that is not an injective function. What if we
6




























could devise a system so that every L in the plaintext is not encrypted into the
same letter? One L becomes P, another A, and another H. Similarly, what if
every G in the ciphertext does not come from the same plaintext letter? One G
is an encrypted F, while another is an encrypted N. This may seem clunky and
nearly impossible. How will Bob deccrypt the message if one ciphertext letter
can refer to many plaintext letters? But with the Vigenére Cipher, the process
is actually quite simple.
The Vigenére Cipher is so named because it was found in Blaise de Vigenére’s
16th century book, which describes numerous ciphers. Vigenére is a polyalpha-
betic cipher, meaning that each letter is encrypted using a different ciphertext
alphabet than the preceding letter.[2] It works like this:
1. Alice and Bob agree on a key word or phrase.
2. Each letter of the key determines how far to shift each plaintext letter. (A
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indicates a shift of 0, B indicates a shift of 1, and so on.)
3. The key is repeated until all of the plaintext has been encrypted.
To better understand how this works, let’s look at an example. Assume
Alice wants to encrypt the message “CIPHERS ARE FUN” using the key word
“APPLE”. Table 4 depicts the encryption process.
The result is that the message is encrypted to “CXESIRH PCI FJC”. The
decryption process is nearly identical. Notice that the two R’s in the plaintext
were encoded to different letters. This is one of the major advantages of Vi-
genére. Because of this, it cannot be deciphered by simple frequency analysis.
However, it is still far from unbreakable.
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Table 4: Vigenére Encryption
Key Shift By Plaintext Ciphertext
A 0 C C
P 15 I X
P 15 P E
L 11 H S
E 4 E I
A 0 R R
P 15 S H
P 15 A P
L 11 R C
E 4 E I
A 0 F F
P 15 U J
P 15 N C
3.1 Vigenére Cryptanalysis
The first step in cryptanalysis of a Vigenére cipher is to determine the length of
the keyword. One approach is to use the Kasiski method, developed by Friedrich
Kasiski in 1863.[2] This method involves searching for repeated fragments in the
ciphertext and recording the distances between these fragments. It is likely that
the key length divides these distances. Another method can be used to check
if the key length found using the Kasiski method is correct or to guess and
check various key lengths when the ciphertext contains no repeated fragments,
rendering the Kasiski method unhelpful. This method begins by assuming the
key length is k. Extract every kth letter from the ciphertext, beginning with
the 1st letter, and concatenate them into a single string of letters. If k is indeed
the length of the key, each letter in this string will have all been encrypted using
the same letter of the key, making it a Caesar cipher. In order to check if this is
truly the key length, we can compare the relative frequencies of letters to what
is expected based on letter frequencies in the English language, represented in
Table 3. One method of accomplishing this task is using a metric called the index
of coincidence, which is the probability that two randomly chosen characters in
a string are identical.[2]
Let s = c1c2c3 · · · cn be a string of n characters, and let letters a, b, · · · , z
be represented by the numbers 0, 1, · · · , 25. For a value i = 0, 1, · · · , 25, let Fi
be the number of times the letter represented by i appears in the string s. The






= Fi(Fi−1)2 . To get the total number of ways to choose any
2 identical letters, we must sum this value for every i. Divide this sum by the





= n(n−1)2 , and we have a
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If the string consists of random letters, the probability that one randomly
chosen character is the same as another is 126 ≈ 0.0385 since there are 26 letters
in the alphabet. In English text however, some letters are much more likely
than others. In a string consisting of 10,000 characters, the following index of
coincidence would be expected.[2]
815 · 814 + 144 · 143 + 276 · 275 + · · ·+ 8 · 7
10000 · 999
≈ 0.0685
Though the index of coincidence will fluctuate from one string of text to the
next, we can generally assume that strings of random letters will have an index
of coincidence closer to 0.0385 while strings of English text will have an index
of coincidence closer to 0.0685.
To determine the key length of a message encrypted with Vigenére, we must
extract characters from the text at various intervals of length k—every kth letter
for k = 5, k = 6, and so on—and form strings from these characters. The k for
which the corresponding strings of characters have index of coincidences nearest
to 0.0685 is likely the key length.
Knowing the key length k, we can again group the letters of the ciphertext so
that we have multiple Caesar ciphers. For the example when k = 5, we should
have 5 strings. If ci is the ith character in the ciphertext, then our 5 strings will
be
s1 = c1c6c11 · · ·
s2 = c2c7c12 · · ·
s3 = c3c8c13 · · ·
s4 = c4c9c14 · · ·
s5 = c5c10c15 · · ·
To determine the key exactly, we must compare each of these strings to one
another using the mutual index of coincidence. The mutual index of coincidence
for two strings is the probability that 2 randomly chosen letters, one from each
string, will be the same.[2]
Let |s| be the number of characters in a string s. Let Fi(s) be the number
of times the ith letter appears in string s. Then the number of ways to choose
the ith letter from both strings, s and t, is Fi(s)Fi(t). The total number of
ways to choose the same letter from both strings is the sum of this product for
all possible values of i:
∑25
i=0 Fi(s)Fi(t). Divide this by the number of ways to









The mutual index of coincidence can be interpreted in this way: Strings
encrypted by the same substitution cipher will have a large mutual index of
coincidence since the frequencies of various letters are expected to be the same
between the two strings. Conversely, two strings encrypted by different substi-
tution ciphers should have a small mutual index of coincidence.
Now assume we have a ciphertext with a known key length of k and have
divided that ciphertext into k strings. Let’s say that string si is shifted by some
amount βi. Then if we have 2 strings, si and sj , we can shift si by σ = βj − βi.
After this additional shift, si will have the same shift as sj .
So in order to determine the key, we must compare si with sj shifted by
various amounts σ in a process of ascertaining when σ = βj − βi. Let sj + σ
notate the string that results when the characters in sj are shifted by σ. To
determine when σ = βj − βi, we are looking for a value of σ that makes makes
the mutual index of coincidence of si and sj + σ large. We compute mutual
indices of coincidence for values of σ from 0 to 25, and select those which are
larger than 0.065. For these values of σ, it is likely that βi − βj ≡ σ mod 26.
This results in a system of equations.
β2 = β1 + σ2
β3 = β1 + σ3
β4 = β1 + σ4
...
βk = β1 + σk
Now the shift value for each string s2, s3, · · · , sk is written in terms of the shift
value for s1. Therefore, we have effectively decreased our keyspace to 26. All
there is left to do is try each key, shift value for s1, until one results in the
plaintext.[2]
4 The Enigma Cipher Machine
Enigma is an electromechanical machine, accomplishing ciphering and decipher-
ing using wires, rotors, lights, and electrical currents.[3] Its structure can be
broken down into six major components. In order to understand the machine
as a whole, it is helpful to first examine each component on its own.
4.1 Keyboard
The first element of the Enigma machine is the keyboard. The keyboard is noth-
ing unfamiliar. It is simply a normal typewriter keyboard with wires connecting
each letter to the plugboard.
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4.2 Plugboard
The plugboard is the first step of encryption and basically functions as a sym-
metrical substitution cipher. Enigma’s plugboard had an electrical port for each
letter, and operators were given 10 chords to connect various letters. Essentially,
10 letters would be swapped with 10 other letters. For example, imagine the
operator was told to connect the 10 wires in the following way: AZ, BP, CH,
DN, EM, FS, GW, JY, KT, LQ. Then the plugboard would essentially be a
simple substitution cipher with the encryption alphabet depicted in Table 5.




























Notice that some letters—in this case I, O, R, U, V, and X—are encrypted
to themselves. The other 20 letters in the alphabet are swapped with another
letter.
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Figure 1: Enigma Plugboard
4.3 Static Wheel
The next element of Enigma is the static wheel. This piece does nothing for
encryption purposes. It serves as a connecting piece between the plugboard and
the rotors.
4.4 Rotors and Scrambler
The three rotors form the scrambler, which is arguably the most vital component
of Enigma. This element is where the bulk of the encryption takes place. Each
rotor, on its own, is essentially another simple substitution cipher. Conceptually,
it consists of two alphabets, one on each face of the rotor, and a wiring maze
in the middle connecting each letter to one letter in the other alphabet. For
example, one rotor could use the encryption alphabet shown in Table 6. In this
case, if the electrical current enters the rotor through the C port, it will leave
the rotor through the M port.
In the Enigma machine, one side of a rotor has 26 copper pins where the
electrical current enters, one for each letter, and the other side had 26 copper
contacts where the current continues into the next rotor. Three rotors are placed
side-by-side, copper pins of one touching the contact points of the next (pictured
in Figure 2). As the electrical current travels through the second rotor, it is
transformed by a different substitution cipher and then transformed yet again
by the third rotor.
While having three back-to-back substitution ciphers sounds complex, it is
in reality no more secure than having one substitution cipher. To illustrate this,
let Table 7 represent the substitution alphabets of three rotors and consider the
following example.
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When the electrical current enters through port C, it is sent through port
M. Then in the second rotor, M is sent to W. Finally, in the third rotor, W is
sent to U. This process is effectively the same as simply sending C directly to U
in the first place. Therefore, any encrypted message using simple substitution
ciphers, even three of them in a row, is still susceptible to frequency analysis.
However the true genius of the Enigma scrambler lies in what rotors are
designed to do: rotate. After a character is typed, rotor I rotates one notch,
altering the positions of the copper pins and contact points in relation to the
static wheel, the other two rotors, and the reflector (to be discussed). The
internal wiring maze remains the same, but the entry point of the electrical
current is shifted.
After the operator has typed 26 characters—meaning rotor I has made a
complete rotation—rotor II also rotates one notch. Rotor I then makes another
complete rotation with the rotor II in this new position. When rotor I completes
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Table 7: Encryption by Three Rotors
Plaintext Rotor I Ciphertext Rotor II Ciphertext Rotor III Ciphertext
A E A B
B K J D
C M D F
D F K H
E L S J
F G I L
G D R C
H Q U P
I V X R
J Z B T
K N L X
L T H V
M O W Z
N W T N
O Y M Y
P H C E
Q X Q I
R U G W
S S Z G
T P N A
U A P K
V I Y M
W B F U
X R V S
Y C O Q
Z J E O
another rotation, rotor II clicks one more notch forward. Rotor II eventually
makes a complete rotation—262 = 676 characters into the message—at which
time rotor III rotates one notch. Note that the design of the rotors causes a
double-step at this point. In other words, rotor II and rotor III both shift one
notch at the same time. Then the whole cycle repeats again. Another 675
characters later, rotor III shifts again one more notch.
Finally, after 26 × 25 × 26 = 16900 characters have been typed, the three
rotors will all be back in their original positions, and the cycle starts over from
the beginning. This system could be compared to a Vigenére cipher with a key
length of 16900. As an additional measure of security, the German military
had eight rotors with different internal wiring mazes. Any permutation of three
could be used at once. That is 8!(8−3)! = 336 possibilities.
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Figure 2: Enigma Rotors
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Figure 3: Enigma Keyboard and Lampboard
4.5 Reflector
The reflector follows the three rotors. It performs a symmetrical encryption and
then sends the electrical signal back through the machine. This symmetrical
encryption ensures that decryption and encryption settings are the same.
4.6 Lampboard
After the current is reflected, it travels back through the three rotors, the static
wheel, and the plugboard. Finally, the signal makes it back to the lampboard,
the final component. The lampboard is arranged like a keyboard, and each
letter has a small light bulb beneath it. When the electrical current reaches a




The German Enigma cipher machine was the most advanced cryptosystem of
its time. It presented a monumental challenge to the Allied forces’ cryptana-
lysts because of its incredible strengths. Enigma masterfully balanced the two
opposing elements of any cryptosystem: security and ease of use.
The tangible machine itself was “flexible, portable, reasonably rapid, and
easy to use.” [3, pg. 30]. It was small, relatively lightweight, and could be
easily carried by one person from location to location. It was reasonably easy for
any operator to use, not requiring any mathematics or troublesome encryption
tables and charts. Once daily settings were in place, encrypting and decrypting
messages was no more complicated than using a standard typewriter.
Despite its operational simplicity, Enigma was uncommonly complex and
secure. First and foremost, it was not only safe against straightforward fre-
quency analysis, but was also safe against the Kasiski and Index of Coincedence
methods, used for Vigenére cryptanalysis, because of the extraordinarily large
key length. Recall that the spinning action of the rotors results in a the key
length of 16900. It was also secure against brute force attacks because there
are approximately 15 million million million (that’s 15,000,000,000,000,000,000)
possible settings. Even if cryptanalysts were able to check 1000 settings every
second, it would take over 475,321,317 years to check every possible setting.
Therefore, without knowing the daily plugboard and rotor settings, even pos-
sessing an Enigma machine would be of little use to the enemy because of the
statistically overwhelming number of possible settings.[3]
Another strength of Enigma is that it “allowed extensive exploitation of
radio.”[3, pg. 30]. It allowed German military communications to capitalize on
radio technology, which was prevalent and easy to use but also easily intercepted,
without compromising security.
In addition to these strengths in design, the Germans also instituted opera-
tional practices to ensure the security of Enigma. In the early days, the Germans
changed the settings only every three months. They soon recognized that more
frequent changes were necessary. Settings were then changed monthly, then
daily, and eventually multiple times throughout a single day.[3] Additionally,
the ring settings—the starting positions of the three rotors—were different for
each message. In fact, operators growing lax on this security measure was actu-
ally a key element in Enigma’s demise, which will be discussed in the following
section.
The Germans also put numerous security measures into operation to ensure
that physical compromise would not dismantle all communications. For exam-
ple, the German navy printed all codebooks in water-soluble ink and instructed
operators to throw them into the ocean if capture was anticipated.[3]
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6 Enigma Vulnerabilities and German Blunders
Some of Enigma’s vulnerabilities lie in the fundamental design of the machine.
First of all, a great convenience of Enigma is its symmetry. The settings to
encipher a message and decipher that same message are the same.[3] This is
made possible by the reflector element, but the reflector also guaranteed that no
letter could ever be encrypted to itself. Of course, this is very useful information
for the cryptanalysts trying to crack the code. Additionally, due to the natures
of the plugboard and reflector, Enigma only substituted letters reciprocally. For
example, if A was encrypted to C, then C was encrypted to A under identical
settings.[3]
Though these design weaknesses are not insignificant, most of the security
vulnerabilities in Enigma were actually due to military practices and human
errors. German intelligence had multiple rules that drastically decreased the
key space of Enigma. In regards to the plugboard, the settings always used
exactly 10 wires, and connecting sequential letters on the plugboard was not
allowed.[3] With these limitations and more, the number of possible settings
was reduced from 3× 10114 to 1× 1023.
To their credit, the Germans did introduce updates throughout the war to
increase the security of Enigma, but these modifications were usually imple-
mented one at a time.[3] Thus the cryptanalysts had time to understand and
adjust to one change before another came down the pipe. Initiating multiple
improvements at one time likely would have presented more of a challenge for
Allied code-breakers at Bletchley Park.
Individual operators also contributed to Enigma’s vulnerabilities. The Ger-
mans recognized that if they used the same settings for every message through-
out an entire day, the enemy would be able to use a form of cryptanalysis similar
to the method previously discussed for the Vigenére cipher. The first letter of
every message would have been encrypted using the same encryption alphabet.
The same is true for the second letter of every message, and so on. In order to
prevent this, it was standard procedure to start encryption with the three rotors
in different starting positions for each message. In order to indicate these ring
settings, the operator would set up the machine in accordance with the daily
settings and type three random letters, then type the same three letters again
to account for radio communication errors. The operator would then turn the
three rotors so that the previously typed three letters appeared in the windows
above the rotors and proceed with the rest of the message. The receiving opera-
tor would type the first six letters of the message with the machine set according
to the daily settings. Then, reading the ring settings, he would reset the ro-
tors to the indicated positions and decode the remainder of the message. This
practice theoretically made frequency analysis impossible. However, operators
often got into the habit of using the same three letters for every message. This
gave cryptanalysts a huge crack because it allowed them to immediately rule
out many possible settings.[3] In fact, code-breakers were able to use repetition
to their advantage in other ways as well. For example, the content of some
messages were predictable, and the Allies were able to use these predictable
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components to eliminate Enigma settings.[3]
7 Breaking Enigma
Though every cryptosystem has technical vulnerabilities, and Enigma is no ex-
ception, its defeat in this case “arose less from a technological flaw than from the
systematic failure of an entire intelligence system” and from the adept crypt-
analysis efforts of the Allied forces.[3]
German cryptographic successes in the early days of war lead to compla-
cency in cryptographic communications. Because of pride and perceived im-
penetrability, the German military used Enigma almost exclusively for wartime
communications of every class, from routine weather reports to highly sensitive
material.[3] And routine was Enigma’s biggest downfall. Certain types of mes-
sages were sent habitually and predictably. They were sent regularly from a
particular sender to a certain receiver at a typical time of day, and often, the
content of the message was similar. Allied intelligence was able to use key words
and phrases to find a crack in the system. By knowing a portion or portions
of the message, cryptanalysts could eliminate certain possible settings from the
onset and drastically reduce the number of Enigma settings to try.
7.1 Polish Cryptanalysis
Before the war even began, Polish intelligence had already made substantial
progress on breaking Enigma by exploiting the German operating procedure of
typing the ring settings twice at the beginning of each message. They invented
an electromechanical machine, called Bomba, which could eliminate impossible
settings from the onset and run through potential settings.[4] Just before Ger-
many invaded Poland in 1939, the Poles passed on all the intelligence they had
gathered to the British and French.
7.2 British Cryptanalysis
The British, including its highest government officials, well understood the cru-
cial role of signals intelligence and devoted substantial resources towards its
success, including financial and human capital. Their efforts were not haphaz-
ard, but well organized and strategic throughout the duration of the war. The
British consolidated all cryptanalysis efforts in a centralized signals intelligence
organization, the Government Code and Cypher School, rather than having sep-
arate operations for German, Japanese, naval, military, diplomacy, and other
code breaking operations.[3] Previously, several separate departments attacked
foreign codes and ciphers with little or no coordination between them. By
“concentrating its complete cryptanalytic effort in a single centralized organiza-
tion,” British intelligence was able to collaborate and extrapolate information
and techniques.[3] The hub of cryptographic efforts was at Bletchley Park, and
this physical centralization also helped intelligence staff to understand the role
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their piece played in the grand scheme and understand its importance.[3] People
working at Bletchley Park included military personnel and civilians alike. It is
estimated that the total number of people working at Bletchley Park during the
war was as high as 10,000, a large proportion of which was civilian staff.[3] The
British put a lot of focus on recruiting highly talented, intelligent university
students and professors in the fields of linguistics, mathematics, history, phys-
ical sciences, and others.[3] Two mathematicians who ultimately became very
crucial to the work at Bletchley Park were Alan Turing and Gordon Welchman,
who were both recruited because of their notable chess skills.
It was Turing and Welchman who contributed most to Enigma’s downfall.
By 1940, the Germans had realized the vulnerability in keying the ring settings
twice at the beginning of each message and stopped this practice, making the
Polish Bomba ineffective.[4] Fortunately, Turing had already developed another
machine, called the Bombe, which used a different method. Instead of relying
on ring setting indicators at the beginning of each message, Turing’s machine
used assumptions about known plaintext within the message, called a crib. The
process of finding cribs is greatly aided by the fact that a letter is never encrypted
to itself. Using a crib as a starting point, the cryptanalysts would create a menu.
For example, assume that a section of ciphertext “BNXILLLRAJZIQJQQF” is
thought to read “THEWEATHERTODAYIS” in plaintext.



















Using this we can create a diagram, which we will use to determine the
Bombe’s settings. In the diagram shown in Figure 4, a line connecting two
letters indicates that Enigma encrypts one letter to the other at the indicated
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Figure 4: Bombe Menu Diagram
position. For example, T is encrypted to B at position 1. Because of symmetry
in design, B is also encrypted to T in this same position.
An operator would set up the Bombe using a similar diagram. The machine
would then run through and eliminate candidate settings that were incompatible
with the given menu.[1] Welchman further improved the Bombe in 1940 by
adding what is known as the diagonal board.[4] This addition reduced the steps
necessary to determine the proper settings.
The result is that by the end of the war, the Allied powers’ code-breakers
were reading German messages with regularity. Still, they chose which pieces
of intelligence to act on very carefully so as not to arouse German suspicion.
This they did with undeniable success, as even after the war German military
leaders remained confident in Enigma’s impenetrability.
8 Implications in the Field of Cryptography
The development and subsequent defeat of the German Enigma cipher machine
has had a substantial impact in the fields of cryptography and computing. First
of all, it initiated the shift of cryptography from by-hand methods to automated
and mechanized, which in turn created the need for automated and mechanized
cryptanalysis.[3] Therefore, Enigma acted as a catalyst for the development of
computers. Today, computers constantly utilize cryptographic communications,
using complex mathematical algorithms, for even the simplest everyday tasks.
One lesson learned from Enigma though is that in the modern world, relying
on complexity for security is inadequate. “If we of the twenty-first century rely
on the sheer mathematical capabilities of computers for protection, we will be
repeating the Germans’ blindness.”[3] It is imperative to never underestimate
the human factor in a system’s vulnerability. Though cryptosystems used by
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modern computers are incredibly complex, it is the human factor that causes
trouble. For example, people using predictable passwords or the same password
for multiple purposes. Therefore, cryptosystems in the modern world must be
designed not for absolute security, which is impossible, but reasonable secu-
rity. This is security such that a single failure does not compromise the entire
system.[3] Above all, the most valuable lesson learned is that securing a cryp-
tosystem is a continual process. Once a method is in place, it must constantly
be testing for vulnerabilities and improved.
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